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The Libyan Model and Strategy: 
Why it Won't Work in Syria
Colonel Lance Kildron1
U.S. Air Force
Introduction
Officials from the Obama administration have stated that the strategy 
used in Libya is the model for future U.S. military engagements overseas.2 
Taking a limited means approach, the administration mobilized a military 
coalition, which executed a successful air campaign using coordinated 
Abstract
Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011) is the latest example of how a 
limited-means military intervention in a humanitarian crisis can stop the 
murder of innocent civilians. Proponents of intervention in the name of 
"responsibility to protect" (R2P) have stated that the air campaign strat-
egy used in Libya could be the model for future U.S. military engagement 
overseas. This begs the question of when the United States should insert 
itself militarily into a humanitarian crisis. For instance, Syria is a poten-
tial candidate for military intervention. The following article takes the 
reasons for military intervention in Libya, as explained by President 
Obama in his address to the nation in March 2011, and creates criteria for 
future humanitarian military intervention. By defining and applying these 
criteria to a humanitarian crisis such as Syria, it is revealed that the Libya 
campaign model does not fit Syria now, nor does the model provide a pan-
acea for all future humanitarian crises. While the tenets of the Libya strat-
egy could apply to other humanitarian crises, proponents for military 
intervention must meet the criteria laid out in this article, or the United 
States may find itself committed to a futile air campaign unable to achieve 
the nation's strategic objectives.
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missile and air attacks to help opposition ground forces overthrow Gen-
eral Muammar Gadhafi. The success in Libya, however, has created a pol-
icy and strategy dilemma for the United States as political and military 
leaders try to determine when military intervention in a future humani-
tarian crisis is the best option. While military force worked in Libya, this 
limited means approach may not be effective in every "responsibility to 
protect" (R2P) scenario, such as in Syria, which is going through similar 
civil strife issues. Proponents for military intervention in the name of R2P 
must first apply the criteria developed for Libya and meet each one before 
endorsing military force in the next humanitarian crisis. Definition of the 
Libya strategy, and application of its criteria to the predicament in Syria, 
reveals that the Libyan campaign model does not provide a panacea for all 
humanitarian crises.
The Libya Criteria
In President Obama's March 28, 2011 speech to the American people, the 
President laid out the reasons he chose to take military action in Libya 
and stop the violence against innocent civilians. President Obama said, 
"We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate 
for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab coun-
tries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had 
the ability to stop Qaddafi's forces in their tracks without putting Ameri-
can troops on the ground." The President further stated that he "autho-
rized military action to stop the killing and enforce UN Security Council 
Resolution 1973."3
From the President's speech, his stated reasons for intervention in Libya 
can be interpreted into a set of criteria for U.S. military intervention in 
future humanitarian crises. Based on the reasons noted in his speech, the 
following criteria were developed, by the author, and should be used by 
U.S. leadership before committing U.S. forces to intervene militarily in 
future humanitarian crises. The developed criteria are: 1) an international 
mandate; 2) a broad coalition to protect civilians; 3) Arab/Regional sup-
port; and, 4) a request for help from a credible Libyan opposition force. 
Additionally, this request for help did not require U.S. ground forces to 
intervene.
Meeting these criteria were the foundation for the success of military 
intervention and the Libyan model. President Obama's decision to inter-
vene also aligned with principles of the 2010 National Security Strategy's 
(NSS) R2P objectives that state "the United States will work both multi-
laterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, 
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and—in certain instances—military means to prevent and respond to 
genocide and mass atrocities."4 He further justified the use of military 
force by stating, "When our interests and values are at stake, we have a 
responsibility to act."5 In meeting these criteria, the President ensured 
that the United States did not act alone nor intervene in a region that did 
not ask for help. If the United States uses these criteria as a baseline for 
future R2P scenarios, political and military leadership can avoid becom-
ing trapped militarily in a conflict that is not in the country's best interest.
Libyan Conflict
The Arab Spring swept across Libya in late February 2010. The uprising 
in Libya had a similar tenacity that the rebellions in Tunisia and Egypt 
had, both of which caused a regime change. However, in Libya, General 
Muammar Gadhafi was in his forty-second year of power and the Libyan 
ruler was not going to give up without a fight.6 Gadhafi's use of force to 
quell the Libyan uprising brought forth an international mandate, in the 
form of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 that 
authorized military intervention in Libya. Scenes of violence aired on 
international news channels depicting protesters clashing with regime 
forces in Benghazi. This was the first show of defiance by the people of 
Libya, and in less than a month President Barack Obama would support 
military intervention eventually leading to a 222-day North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign.7
With the approval of President Obama, an initial multinational coalition 
led by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) entered Libyan airspace on 
March 19, 2011 aimed at enforcing UNSCR 1973. Officially named Opera-
tion Odyssey Dawn, the mission's operational objectives in Libya focused 
on stopping Gadhafi's forces from attacking civilians, forcing regime mili-
tary troops back to their home bases and ensuring unrestricted humani-
tarian support was available for the people of Libya.8 On March 31, after 
successfully suppressing the most capable strategic air defense systems in 
Libya and establishing a no-fly zone, the mission transitioned command 
and control to NATO under the name Operation Unified Protector.9
Despite Gadhafi's stubborn defiance, NATO aircraft continued to attack 
regime forces in support of the Libyan rebels. On August 22, opposition 
forces liberated the capital city of Tripoli. Opposition forces would even-
tually capture and kill Gadhafi on October 20. NATO ceased military 
operations Operation Unified Protector on October 31, 2011.10 For Presi-
dent Obama, justification for military intervention hinged on the 2010 
NSS R2P principles embedded in his vision for U.S. strategy. The Presi-
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dent, however, first ensured he met favorable criteria for U.S. interven-
tion and did not respond with military force based solely on the tenets of 
R2P.
Libyan Strategy/Model Defined
The Libyan model was a multilateral effort combining diplomatic and mil-
itary power to achieve its objectives—intervention in the name of R2P. 
Furthermore, the strategy taken by the United States and its allies used 
limited means to accomplish an unlimited objective, the removal of Gen-
eral Muammar Gadhafi from power. Notably, the strategy was successful 
by using only a limited portion of the United States' military capabilities, 
air and sea power in order to aid NATO operations and an indigenous 
opposition ground force. These limited means included the use of fighter 
and bomber aircraft to target Libyan military facilities, command and 
control centers, air defense sites, as well as Gadhafi's fielded military 
forces.11 No foreign ground forces were committed in Libya, and NATO 
took on a robust leadership role with European and Canadian allies lead-
ing Unified Protector.12 The U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for 
Strategic Communications, Ben Rhodes, praised the Libyan model as the 
key to future intervention operations for the Obama administration.13
Strengths of the Libyan model included an international mandate to pro-
tect civilians supported by a broad coalition that included Arab countries. 
Furthermore, no foreign ground forces were used in the fight. The inter-
national mandate included UNSCR 1970, which encompassed global eco-
nomic sanctions supported by the European Union, Russia, China, Japan 
and South Korea. Final international approval and support for military 
action came when the UNSC approved Resolution 1973, the establishment 
of a no-fly zone over Libya, authorizing UN member states to take any 
measures short of occupation to protect civilians under attack in Libya.14
The model's broad coalition included France, Italy, Britain and surround-
ing Arab nations, giving credibility to intervention and reinforcing a mul-
tilateral strategy to use military force against Gadhafi. Britain, Italy and 
France publically advocated for intervention and led the NATO force after 
the UNSC voted to authorize a no-fly zone.15 French President Sarkozy, 
eager to prove France was still a force both politically and militarily in the 
European Union, also supported intervention.16 Jordan, Qatar, and 
Kuwait each lent support to the no-fly zone with military aircraft, provid-
ing additional regional legitimacy to the coalition's mission.17 The use of 
NATO as the operational lead for Unified Protector also helped temper 
the possible negative responses that a U.S.-unilateral military effort might 
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cause. By taking a coalition approach in Libya, the United States shared 
military responsibility and risk; ninety percent of the targets struck in 
Libya were by non-U.S. aircraft.18
Most importantly, opposition forces held a geographically defendable 
position in Libya. The opposition secured a main base of operations in 
Benghazi, and had credible military leadership in control of opposition 
forces. Opposition military leaders included officers who were defectors 
from the Gadhafi regime, and these officers were actively leading opposi-
tion forces in battle. Opposition forces were also able to control military 
facilities and had secured and held police stations in Libyan cities. 
Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) leaders were also able to 
meet outside the country with influential international leaders and solicit 
support for the rebellion.19 Recognition by the Arab world, European 
Union, and the United States brought legitimacy to the ITNC and its top 
leadership.20 Because of this strong opposition force, the Libyan model 
required no foreign ground forces or foreign occupation compared to pre-
vious U.S. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 This was appealing to both 
the American public and to Arab countries wary of an increased U.S. mili-
tary presence in the region. Without credible opposition forces, the lim-
ited means approach of Unified Protector would not have succeeded in 
stopping Gadhafi's regime forces nor would it have been successful in 
forcing regime change.
The presence of a credible ground force, with a geographically defendable 
position, provided air power a definable objective and a visible force to 
support from the air. Comparing Kosovo, early Afghanistan, and Libya, it 
is also apparent that each of these conflicts used air power to support a 
credible ground force. The Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was capable 
of establishing defendable bases allowing U.S. Special Forces to recruit 
and rally opposition forces against the Taliban. Overall success against 
the Taliban would not have been possible without the combination of pre-
cision air power with ground forces, able to fight for and secure terri-
tory.22 Similar to operations in Libya, both air and ground elements 
combined to overthrow a hostile regime. Without both elements, major 
American troop concentrations would have been required to achieve U.S. 
objectives in both Afghanistan and Libya.23 The three conflicts noted in 
Table 1 below possessed either a strong opposition force in the country, or 
a strong opposition force aided by outside Special Forces or the threat to 
use NATO ground forces. Table 1 is a comparative description of previous 
campaigns in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. While each case was 
unique, as the table shows, ground forces with a geographical base were 
present in all three conflicts.
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Syria Crisis
In Syria, if the Obama administration exclusively applied the R2P princi-
ples discussed in the 2010 NSS, then U.S. leadership could decide to con-
duct military intervention in the name of human rights. However, before 
engaging militarily in another humanitarian crisis, U.S. policymakers 
should take each of the criteria used in Libya and apply them to the situa-
tion in Syria. By applying these criteria to Syria, it is evident that limited 
military intervention similar to the Libya campaign model does not fit in 
Syria. As a reminder, these criteria included an international mandate, a 
broad coalition to protect civilians, regional support, and a request for 
help from a credible opposition force.
Lack of an International Mandate
In Syria, there is no international mandate for military intervention in the 
form of a UNSC resolution. Notably, both Russia and China have aggres-
sively objected to sanctions and both countries voted to block a UNSC res-
olution that would have imposed economic sanctions against Syria. The 
resolution, similar to UNSCR 1970 would have demanded that the Syrian 
leader halt all violence against his people.31 Unlike in the Libya case, Rus-
sia sees Syria as one of the last strongholds for anti-American dominance 
in the region, and Russia has both economic interests and a military part-
nership it wishes to protect in Syria.32 To emphasize this point, in Novem-
ber 2011, Russia deployed a carrier group to its base in Tartus, Syria, 
displaying Russia's continued interest in the nation and support for Presi-
dent Assad.33 Without a UNSC resolution, a strong international mandate 
will not form against Assad to the level seen against Gadhafi. Further-
more, it is unlikely that the UNSC will pass a resolution authorizing force 
to provide international legitimacy for military action, as witnessed 
against Libya.
Lack of a Broad Coalition/Support for Military Action
While international disapproval of Assad's actions has been robust, a 
broad coalition supporting military force against his regime has not 
formed. In Libya, the French, and British supported military action 
against Gadhafi, and aggressively lobbied the United States to join a coali-
tion that backed a no-fly zone.34 However, in Syria, France's ambassador 
to the United Nations indicated previously that outside intervention in 
Syria could result in an all-out civil war, believing that military interven-
tion could put the whole region in jeopardy of turmoil.35 In addition, Brit-
ish Prime Minister David Cameron, a strong supporter for military 
intervention in Libya, believes Syria is a different case and recently said, 
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"In Libya there was a United Nations resolution and support from the 
Arab League for action, whereas in the Syrian case there is neither."36 
Without support from key NATO countries such Britain and France, for-
mation of a broad military coalition will be difficult.
Furthermore, intervention in Syria would require a more robust military 
effort than Libya, due to Syria's geography and defensive military capabil-
ities.37 Countries in the region have not called for military intervention in 
Syria with the exception of Turkey who has threatened Assad with mili-
tary action.38 The geographic location of Syria, compared to Libya, would 
require more logistical support for aircraft enforcing a no-fly zone, as 
there are limited NATO bases in the region.
Lack of Arab Support
Economically and diplomatically, regional pressure is mounting against 
Syria. The United States, along with the European Union and the Arab 
League have passed wide-ranging sanctions against individuals and orga-
nizations in Syria. In fact, 19 of the Arab league's 22 member nations 
approved sanctions ranging from a financial freeze on the Central Bank of 
Syria, to a travel ban on Syrian government officials.39 However, Lebanon 
and Iraq both voted against the Arab League sanctions and are not likely 
to enforce serious economic restrictions.40 Right next door, Turkey's 
Prime Minister Erdogan has publicly called for Assad to stop attacks 
against his people and has continued to engage Assad in diplomatic nego-
tiations hoping to halt the violence in Syria.41 Neighboring countries are 
ramping up pressure against Assad on the economic and financial front. 
However, the Arab League has not asked for military intervention and 
surrounding countries have not demanded the enforcement of a no-fly 
zone in comparison to the Libyan crisis.
Lack of a Credible Opposition Force
Syrian opposition leaders are pleading for help and asking for military 
intervention similar to those called for in March 2011, by the Libyan 
ITNC. On January 2, 2012, one exiled Syrian opposition leader and mem-
ber of the opposition's Syrian National Council (SNC) executive board, 
Samir Nashar, said a majority of SNC members support military action. 
Nashar said the Syrian regime is worse than Gadhafi's regime, and Nashar 
has publicly called for a no-fly zone over Syria. Nashar pointed to the fact 
that Assad had not stopped his crackdown on dissent in Syria, even as 
Arab League monitors were in the country assessing Assad's implementa-
tion of a peace plan.42
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Nevertheless, these cries for help have not come from a robust Syrian 
opposition with a recognized and identifiable leader, nor have Syrian 
opposition forces secured defensible territories or a home base.43 The 
Syrian opposition lacks a base or territory where they can reorganize and 
regroup, as the Libyan opposition did in the city of Benghazi. The Syrian 
opposition does not seem to have a centralized command center and 
opposition members are comprised of deserters and local militia with lim-
ited military weaponry. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) has not shown the 
capacity to keep and hold terrain in Syria, or organize under a credible 
leadership structure, as was the case in Libya.44 In Libya, the fall of Beng-
hazi to opposition forces gave the rebellion a home base of operations and 
a defensible position.45 Table 1, shown earlier, depicted the need for a 
credible ground force to supplement NATO air power, and was a key fac-
tor in NATO's success against Gadhafi. This is a significant part of the Lib-
yan model and, without it, foreign ground forces would be required in 
Syria or an air campaign may yield limited results.
Are These Criteria Too Stringent?
Some could argue that military intervention does not require an interna-
tional mandate in a humanitarian crisis, such as Syria. The air war over 
Kosovo is an example of military intervention without a UNSC resolution. 
In Kosovo, there was no authorization from the UNSC for a no-fly zone to 
stop the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Slobodan Miloševic. Russia 
would not publicly support military intervention, but private conversa-
tions with Russian officials indicated that the Russians would not openly 
oppose a NATO air campaign against Serbian forces.46 Thus, NATO initi-
ated an air campaign and achieved its humanitarian objective to stop 
Miloševic from killing innocent civilians before passing UNSCR 1244. In 
the Syrian case, however, there is no indication from the Russians that 
they would be willing to remain quiet, as they did in Kosovo, while NATO 
takes military action against Syria. This is mainly because of the Russian 
belief that NATO turned the no-fly zone into an excuse for regime change 
in Libya. Since Russia's abstention from UNSCR 1973 paved the way for 
military intervention in Libya, enforcement of a no-fly zone in Syria is a 
showstopper for Russian officials.47
Some may also argue that the requirement for a credible opposition force 
is not necessary to intervene with air power, and that only with air power 
were Libyan opposition forces able to gain and maintain a stronghold in 
Benghazi. Opposition forces in Benghazi were outgunned with limited 
options in early March 2011 as Gadhafi's forces advanced toward the 
city.48 As well, after Operation Odyssey Dawn began enforcement of the 
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no-fly zone, Libyan opposition forces were able to hold their position, 
repel regime forces, and eventually turn the tide of the rebellion. A visit 
from U.S. Senator John McCain to Benghazi, coupled with the deploy-
ment of Predator drones and fighter aircraft attacking regime forces, are 
what some may argue enabled opposition forces to gain the credibility 
needed to overthrow Gadhafi. Some believe that the use of air power 
alone was sufficient. However, in Libya, the air campaign started while 
opposition forces were in control of a significant amount of territory. 
Even before U.S. intervention, the opposition was able to repel regime 
forces in Benghazi, and hold their ground, something Syrian opposition 
forces have not thus far proved capable of achieving.
Additionally, some may disagree that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 
noted in Table 1, was a credible opposition force in Kosovo and that the 
NATO air campaign accomplished its objectives, without the help of 
opposition forces. Lieutenant General Agim Ceku, the former prime min-
ister of Kosovo and chief of the KLA during the war, indicated this in 
interviews. According to him, the KLA was unable to hold territory during 
the war and used Albanian territory to regroup after military operations 
failed against the Serb Army.49 While this may be true, it was not only the 
presence of an opposition force in Kosovo, but the threat of NATO ground 
forces by President Clinton that lent additional credibility to the opposi-
tion and enabled the success of the air campaign.50
Meeting the Criteria
By failing to meet the Libyan criteria in future humanitarian crises, the 
United States may find itself enforcing a protracted no-fly zone similar to 
the one used in Iraq following Desert Storm in 1991. During that time, 
military forces in the region numbered around 20,000. This force 
included the largest combined flying wing in the U.S. Air Force, and 
required the presence of a dedicated carrier battle group with supporting 
warships. This footprint caused U.S. relations in the Middle East to dete-
riorate in the late 1990s and increased U.S. security challenges in the 
region.51 While the United States is trying to decrease its peripheral mili-
tary commitments in the Middle East, the timing is not right for another 
prolonged no-fly zone.
In the future, because of a smaller force driven by budget cuts, the United 
States must be selective in its application of military force for human 
rights efforts. Another protracted military operation would place a signifi-
cant rotational demand on U.S. Forces. Nation building requires ground 
forces to succeed and is a labor-intensive, expensive, and time-consuming 
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process.52 Without a clear, definable strategy with attainable criteria, 
intervention in a humanitarian crisis without a "land force" option could 
leave a NATO air campaign without achievable strategic objectives. More-
over, the opposition might fail and the United States may have to face the 
embarrassment of extracting itself from a conflict, in failure. The United 
States also cannot afford to act unilaterally in a region and risk becoming 
involved in a protracted war that may hinder its planned withdrawal of 
military forces from Afghanistan.
Conclusion
International support is vital to warrant military intervention in the name 
of R2P, and each situation is unique. R2P principles call for military inter-
vention anytime a national government cannot protect its people from 
"large-scale losses of life or ethnic cleansing within its borders."53 How-
ever, as indicated by President Obama in the 2010 NSS, repressive acts by 
a regime against its people do not always mandate the use of military 
force, and the U.S. must consider "the costs and risks of action against the 
costs and risks of inaction" when deciding possible military interven-
tion.54 The key to the Libyan model lies in the multilateral approach 
stated in the 2010 NSS, and not all states or regimes that raise the princi-
ples of R2P are candidates for military intervention.
While parts of the Libyan model are exportable, military intervention is 
not a panacea for all humanitarian crises as conditions must be favorable, 
with a high probability for success, before using military forces. Air power 
alone, in support of R2P, should be selective and only used after meeting 
the baseline criteria used in Libya. In the case of Libya, there was a legiti-
mate international mandate, a broad coalition to protect civilians, support 
from the Arab world, and an identified indigenous opposition force. Mili-
tary intervention in Libya was only initiated after meeting a set of criteria 
that minimized the likelihood of protracted military operations. U.S. mili-
tary and political leaders, determined to invoke the principles of R2P in 
the next humanitarian crisis, must ensure the previously defined criteria 
are met. Otherwise, the U.S. military may find itself committed to a futile 
air campaign unable to achieve the Nation's strategic objectives.
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